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INTRODUCTION
The recent law and economics literature on social norms focuses
on two issues. The first issue concerns the conditions under which
norms should be expected to be efficient. One well-known hypo-
thesis, for example, states that efficient norms emerge in closely knit
groups of well-informed and similarly endowed people whose
cooperative behavior does not produce negative externalities.' The
second issue concerns the attitude the state should take toward
norms. There is some argument, for example, over whether courts
should enforce as law the norms of apparently efficient groups or
should instead insist that parties use formalities.' A related
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I See ROBERT C. ELLiCKsON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETrLE
DISPUTEs 167-83 (1991); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315,
1320-21 (1993).
2 See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 283 (arguing that the law should defer to
group norms for everyday disputes between members); Lisa Bernstein, MerchantLaw
in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U.
PA. L. REv. 1765, 1770 (1996) (stating that "transactors do not necessarily want the
relationship-preserving norms they follow in performing contracts and cooperatively
resolving disputes among themselves to be used by third-party neutrals to decide
[their] cases" (footnote omitted)); Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Lawfor a Complex
Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1643, 1650 (1996) [hereinafter Cooter, Decentralized Law] (stating conditions
under which law should defer to norms); Robert D. Cooter, StructuralAdjudication and
the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 215,
226-27 (1994) (same); Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated
Press: Custom and Law As Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REV. 85, 85
(1992) [hereinafter Epstein, Custom in Property] ("The state's chief function is to
discover and reflect accurately what the community has customarily regarded as
binding social rules and then to enforce those rules in specific controversies.");
Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and Histoiy of Custom in
the Law of Tort, 21J. LEGAL STUD. 3, 4 (1992) [hereinafter Epstein, Custom in Torts]
(arguing that where the standard of liability is negligence, courts should regard
custom as conclusive evidence of due care);Jason S.Johnston, The Statute of Frauds
and Business Norms: A Testable Game-Theoretic Model, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1859,1863-64
(1996) (discussing the Statute of Frauds and the circumstances in which this formality
is or is not needed).
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question concerns the extent to which courts should defer to or
intervene in attempts by groups to resolve disputes using nonlegal
mechanisms.
3
This Article addresses both issues. First, it criticizes the view
that the norms of closely knit groups are efficient, arguing that
under a variety of plausible conditions those norms are likely to be
inefficient, in the sense of failing to enable group members to
exploit the full surplus of collective action.4 Second, it argues that
under a variety of plausible conditions, the state-in particular, its
legislatures and courts-produces rules that are more efficient than
group norms and, furthermore, that help correct the deficiencies of
group norms.
This Article uses theories about the efficiency of the common
law and the efficiency of statutory law to shed light on the likeli-
hood that norms are inefficient. Part I draws some preliminary
distinctions between these three forms of social control and argues
that the conventional claims regarding the efficiency of the common
law and the inefficiency of statutes provide no support for the view
that norms are efficient. Part II discusses phenomena that inhibit
the evolution of efficient norms and suggests some conditions under
which statutes or common law doctrines are more efficient than
norms. The discussion focuses on the roles of information
asymmetry, strategic behavior, and moral tradition in the develop-
ment of inefficient norms. Part III discusses ways in which the state
can transform, undermine, or minimize the impact of inefficient
norms. Part IV provides some illustrations.
3 See, e.g., ELLIKSON, supra note 1, at 249 (discussing grounds for legal interven-
tion); David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV.
373, 379 (1990) ("[L]egal decisionmakers should defer to the parties' decision about
whether their commitments may be legally enforced. Legal decisionmakers should,
however, evaluate that decision in light of... the availability of nonlegal sanctions
and the effectiveness of those sanctions in ensuring compliance."); Eric A. Posner, The
LegalRegulation of Religious Groups, 2 LEGAL THEORY (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript
at 33-39, on file with author) (discussing conditions under which courts should
adjudicate disputes between members of a religious group); Eric A. Posner, The
Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action,
63 U. CH. L. REv. 133, 155-61 (1996) [hereinafter Posner, Regulation of Groups]
(discussing conditions under which courts should intervene in disputes between
members of close-knit groups); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom,
Commerce and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CH. L. REv. 711, 739-49 (1986)
(discussing British and American courts' enforcement and recognition of custom).
' For an argument that comes to this conclusion using a theory of cultural
evolution, seeJody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms
41-44 (Mar. 11, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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I. NORMS, STATUTES, AND COMMON LAW DOCTRINEs
The concept of a "norm" is slippery, and scholars use it in
different ways. I will begin by offering some definitions, and if they
seem arbitrary, it at least can be said that this is a defect shared by
all writings on this subject.'
A norm can be understood as a rule that distinguishes desirable
and undesirable behavior and gives a third party the authority to
punish a person who engages in the undesirable behavior. Thus, a
norm constrains attempts by people to satisfy their preferences. In
these ways, a norm is like a law, except that a private person
sanctions the violator of a norm, whereas a state actor sanctions the
violator of a law.
The rule-like nature of a norm should not disguise the fact that
norms are not enacted and enforced like statutes. It is more
plausible to say that when people observe some behavior, they more
or less spontaneously approve or disapprove of it (or fail to react),
and then reward, penalize, or ignore the actor. People might
contemporaneously or subsequently describe their reactions as a
rule (or "norm"), or they might formulate a rule by generalizing
from these reactions and from reactions they and others have had
in similar cases. Their reactions might even be influenced by such
prior formulations. But this is different from "applying" a preexist-
ing rule to the behavior.
Norms thus resemble common law doctrines more closely than
they resemble statutes. When judges make decisions, they do not
strictly apply a preexisting doctrine to the facts of the case; they are
guided partly by their sense ofjustice. Ifjudges or norm-enforcers
simply applied preexisting rules, then the rules could not evolve:
there must be some element of discretion that allows the decision-
maker to revise the rules in light of new situations. But norms are
not identical to common law doctrines. Judges are more self-
conscious about making their decisions consistent with prior
decisions, whereas norm-producers are more likely to be swayed by
their sense of justice. This is why it is more difficult to describe a
norm than it is to describe a doctrine of the common law. Norms
are fuzzy.
' Compare the definitions used in ELUICKSON, supra note 1, at 127 (defining
norms as rules that emanate from social sources), Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra
note 2, at 1656-57 (emphasizing the use of "norm" to refer to obligation, not to
regularity in behavior) and other sources cited infra.
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The use of the word "norm" in these ways could be criticized for
being too narrow and for being too broad. It is narrow, as it
excludes the rules self-consciously formulated and issued by private
institutions, such as trade associations.6 The exclusion of this kind
of rule sacrifices some generality, but it focuses attention on the
issues that so far have driven the debates.' The definition is also
perhaps too broad: it blurs a variety of different rules that evolve
through private enforcement. But I try to deal with these issues as
they arise.
Norms and laws can be usefully distinguished according to their
degree of centralization, that is, the extent to which the power to
create and modify the rules is concentrated in the hands of a small
number of people who can easily cooperate. Compared to
decentralized rulemaking, centralized rulemaking is both (1) more
effective and streamlined, in the sense that fewer agents must
cooperate in creating and changing the rules; and (2) less responsive
to the needs of the governed, in the sense that those governed by
the rules do not have a direct hand in the formation of the rules.
Consider the first point. The creation of a statute requires the
cooperation of a small number of professional politicians who have
a great deal of contact with each other and who have the oppor-
tunity to create institutional mechanisms, such as committees, that
facilitate the analysis of information and the coordination of
legislative behavior. The creation of a common law doctrine
requires the cooperation of a large number of judges, over long
periods of time, who do not have much contact with each other and
who do not actually communicate with each other, except indirectly
through their opinions. Although sometimes judges appear to
choose doctrines in the way a legislature enacts a statute, in fact the
judge's choice is usually an attempt to unify a large number of
earlier opinions, and whether his choice enters the common law
depends on the willingness of other judges, in future cases, to
6 Examples include the institutions described by Bernstein, supra note 2, at 1771-
72 (explaining the method of dispute resolution utilized by the national Grain and
Feed Association); andJ. Mark Ramseyer, Products Liability Through Private Ordering:
Notes on ajapanese Experiment, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1828 (1996) (discussing the
development of a privately ordered, products liability regime in Japan). For a
discussion of some problems with private lawmaking, see Alan Schwartz & Robert E.
Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 650-52
(1995).
7 See e.g., ELLIcKSON, supra note 1, at 177-82 (focusing on the evolution of norms
in close-knit groups). Ellickson focuses on norms that spontaneously evolve, as
opposed to norms self-consciously issued by private institutions.
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recognize the doctrinal innovation. The creation of a norm requires
the coordination of a large number of people who react more or
less unconsciously to the conduct in question and to the accumula-
tion of spontaneous reactions by others to that conduct.
Now consider the second point. When legislators enact laws, the
laws affect everyone in their jurisdiction, not just the legislators.
While voting and related institutions cause legislators to pay
attention to the interests of their constituents, it is clear that voters
do not have a direct hand in the formation of statutes. When
judges create doctrine, the doctrine affects everyone in the
jurisdiction, notjust thejudges. Althoughjudges may pay attention
to the interests of citizens, the citizens do not have a direct hand in
the writing of judicial opinions. In contrast, all people participate
in the creation of the norms that affect them-simply by reacting
approvingly or disapprovingly to the behavior in question and
taking other steps to impose nonlegal sanctions on violators.
These general distinctions help us focus on the main inquiry of
this Article: whether norms are efficient. One way to pursue this
inquiry is to analyze the extent to which the arguments about the
efficiency or inefficiency of common law doctrines and statutes can
be applied to norms.
The starting point for analyzing efficiency is to say that a rule or
group of rules is efficient if it can plausibly be understood to
maximize social benefits.' But as this definition does not rely on
any observables, more indirect tests are necessary. There are three
alternatives that commonly arise in the literature. First, a rule is
efficient if it has actually been chosen by rational actors under
conditions in which they presumptively behave in a manner that
maximizes social wealth (the choice test). Second, a rule is efficient
if it would survive the competition of other rules in an evolutionary
process that can be shown to produce efficient equilibria (the
evolutionary test).' Third, a rule is efficient if it seems consistent
with a model of economically efficient behavior (the behavioral
test). These tests may seem vague, but they will become clear as
they are applied.
8 Because what really concerns us is the relative efficiency of norms, compared to
that of other kinds of rules, the definition of efficiency will be refined in Part II of
this Article.
' Cf. Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theoy, 58 J. POL.
ECON. 211,211 (1950) (formulating this evolutionary approach as the "interpret[ation
of] the economic system as an adoptive mechanism which chooses among exploratory
actions" generated by adaptive pursuit of "success" or "profits").
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A. Statutes
Economists writing in the public-choice tradition generally argue
that statutes are inefficient. Consider the choice test: On one
model of legislative choice, utility-maximizing legislators maximize
their chances of reelection by favoring those parties who can
contribute most to their reelection. Concentrated interest groups
are such parties. Because the gain to interest groups from legisla-
tion that transfers wealth to them exceeds the cost of successful
lobbying, the interest groups have an incentive to lobby. And since
the resulting loss to any member of the public is less than the cost
of lobbying to her, members of the public have no incentive to resist
the legislation. Legislation should therefore reflect the desires of
interest groups, and because these desires are likely to be redistribu-
tive, statutes are unlikely to be efficient. I
A second argument-the evolutionary argument-is motivated by
suspicion that the legislative-choice model depends too heavily
on an assumption of legislative self-interest. But even if legis-
lators tried to enact legislation in the public interest, one would
still expect interest groups with more at stake to spend more on
lobbying than people or entities with less at stake, such as mem-
bers of the general public. Therefore, the special interest
groups exert constant pressure on the legislature to reconsider
laws that injure them and to consider enacting laws that would
benefit them. Over time, these forces select for legislators with
inclinations or ideologies consistent with the design of the interest
groups, resulting in the inefficient redistributive statutes the groups
desire.
The third argument is that statutes fail the behavioral test. For
example, numerous studies show that the purported public policy
arguments for regulation of the airline, trucking, shipping, and
railroad industries are weak." The statutes do not solve market
failures as has been claimed. Instead, they transfer wealth and
power to certain industries by protecting them from the competi-
tion of potential entrants.
12
"0 See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE
12-37 (1991) (discussingthe theory of legislation as a manifestation ofconflict among
private interests); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 373-439 (rev. ed. 1989)
(same).
" See, for example, the studies collected in CHICAGO STUDIES IN POLITICAL
ECONOMY (GeorgeJ. Stigler ed., 1988).
12 See id. at xii-xiv.
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These arguments are crude and have been heavily criticized and
qualified over the years."3 They do not account for the compli-
cated motives of legislators, the institutional constraints on legisla-
tion, 14 or the numerous statutes that seem to improve on the
common law. But they are useful for our purposes in showing that
statutes are criticized for their lack of responsiveness to the interests
of those they govern.
B. Common Law Doctrines
Some economists have argued that common law doctrines are
efficient. Again, one can look at three types of explanations. First,
under a choice model one might argue that judges decide cases on
the basis of efficiency considerations. Because judges enjoy more
independence than do legislators, they feel less pressure than
legislators to choose rules on the basis of their distributive
effects. 5 According to some, efficiency suggests itself as an attrac-
tive alternative. The problem with this argument is that in order to
argue that judges choose efficiency as their standard of decision,
one must provide a model that shows that such a choice is consis-
tent with maximizing behavior. No one has suggested a plausible
model.
Second, one might make the evolutionary argument that
efficient rules survive over time, whereas inefficient rules die out.
This argument does not assume that judges choose efficient rules.
Because inefficient rules impose more costs on the affected parties
than efficient rules do, the parties have a greater incentive to litigate
disputes arising under inefficient rules and a greater incentive to
settle disputes arising under efficient rules. Repeated litigation over
inefficient rules puts pressure on them to change, even ifjudges act
randomly. But because people are less likely to litigate over
efficient rules, there is considerably less pressure to change them.
Accordingly, efficient rules survive over time, while inefficient rules
are litigated away.' 6
Is See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 10, at 21-33 (noting that while special
interests are influential in the legislative process, there are other factors such as
ideology that shape legislation).
14 This is the subject of the emerging economic theories of political institutions.
See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6J.L. ECON.
& ORGANIZATION 213,214 (1990) (stressing the importance of legislative institutions).
-5 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 523-24 (4th ed. 1992)
(comparing the judicial and legislative systems and their concerns for efficiency and
redistribution).
"6 SeeJohn C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7J.
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The principal difficulty with this argument is that actors who
benefit more from inefficient rules than from efficient rules have
every incentive to litigate the latter while settling disputes arising
under the former. It is possible that the costs and benefits of rules
are exactly symmetrical, so that the parties on either side have an
incentive to settle disputes arising under the efficient rules and to
litigate the disputes arising under the inefficient rules, and not vice
versa. But there is no particular reason to believe that this is true
and ample reason to believe that repeat players can exploit the
institutional constraints binding courts in order to effect doctrinal
changes that redistribute wealth to them.
17
The third argument is that common law doctrines are consistent
with a model of efficient behavior. Most economists believe that an
efficient legal system would have fairly clear rules that enforce
voluntary agreements and secure property rights against the
intrusions of third parties. Some have argued that common law
doctrines are generally consistent with this ideal.'" Many of the
efficiency arguments offered for common law doctrines, however,
have an ad hoc quality;' 9 and some common law doctrines have
resisted all efforts to be rationalized on efficiency grounds.
20
LEGAL STUD. 393, 393-94 (1978); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the
Selection of Efficient Rules, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 67 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the
Common Law Eff cient?, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 59-60 (1977).
" See Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without
the Help ofjudges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 140 (1980) (arguing that, according to an
evolutionary legal analysis, laws do not always achieve efficiency); Jack Hirshleifer,
Evolutionay Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation Versus Conflict Strategies, 4 RES.
L. & ECON. 1, 46-49 (1982) (discussing why the law might not evolve toward
efficiency). For further criticisms and a discussion of the literature, see Gillian K.
Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583, 584-85 (1992)
(criticizing the view that the common law tends toward efficiency); Paul H. Rubin &
Martin J. Bailey, The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 807,
(1994) (arguing that the law is driven by the preferences of lawyers, not of litigants
or ofjudges); MarkJ. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 641 (discussing barriers to the efficient evolution of the law).
s See e.g., POSNER, supra note 15, at 254-55, 523-24 (arguing that common law
doctrines are efficient).
19 See e.g., Gordon Tullock, Two Kinds of Legal Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 659,
666-69 (1980) (arguing that asserted examples of efficiency in the common law could
be merely the result of coincidence).
' See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and
the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of
Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554,566-68 (1977) (finding no plausible efficiency
justification for the penalty doctrine); Eric Rasmusen & Ian Ayres, Mutual and
Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law, 22J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 320-21 (1993) (finding no
plausible efficiency justification for the contract doctrine of mutual mistake).
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Nevertheless, the view that the common law is responsive to the
interests of litigants has some plausibility.
C. Norms
Are norms efficient? The question is difficult to answer for a
variety of reasons, including the elusiveness of the concept of norm.
Certain "general norms," which seem to apply to everyone, have
efficiency-related aspects.2 1  Consider the norm of honesty.
Honesty appears to promote efficiency by allowing people to
depend on the commitments of others and to forego costly
safeguards against opportunistic behavior. But honesty also appears
to interfere with efficiency by preventing people from exploiting
their investments in private information.
22
Jon Elster provides a useful discussion of some norms that seem
either to decrease efficiency or at least not obviously to increase
efficiency.2 ' Two examples give a sufficient flavor of the discus-
sion. Consider the norm against selling one's place in line. The
bargain makes the buyer and seller better off without injuring
anyone else in the line, but it would appear to violate a widespread
norm. Likewise, consider the norm against selling services to one's
neighbor. Although a person might be willing to mow her lawn in
order to avoid paying $10 to the lawn service, she would doubtless
be offended if her neighbor offered to pay her $10 to mow his lawn.
It might be said that the norm of honesty and the norms Elster
discusses are stated too generally, and that more specific versions of
them promote efficiency. Alternatively, one might argue that these
norms are correctly stated and that they are more efficient in the
aggregate, even if not in each individual case, than plausible
alternatives. But it is difficult to evaluate these claims. There is
little reason to believe that general, everyday norms promote
efficiency.
2 4
21 For a highly tentative and qualified argument that general norms are efficient,
see Kenneth J. Arrow, Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and
Externalities, in FRONTIERS OF QuANTATivE ECONOMIES 3,22 (Michael D. Intrilagator
ed., 1971), and for a more vigorous, although qualified argument, see JAMES S.
COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 260-64, 814-15 (1990).
2 See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake; Disclosure, Information, and the Law of
Contracts, 7J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17-18 (1978) (discussing the efficiencyjustification of
allowing buyers not to disclose reasons for making purchases).
2 SeeJON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 138-51
(1989).
24 See id.
17051996]
1706 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 1697
A more plausible and more testable claim is that of the
efficiency of norms produced by closely knit groups of well-
informed and equally endowed people.25 Although this claim is
more limited than the claim that general norms are efficient, it has
important implications if true. Let us subject this proposition to
our three tests of efficiency.
Consider an argument based on the choice test, namely, that
people choose norms in a way that maximizes their welfare. The
argument is not wholly implausible. More so than legislators and
judges, people in a closely knit community internalize the costs of
the inefficient rules they choose. Therefore, they have an incentive
to choose norms that maximize their joint welfare.2" The problem
with that argument is that the norms I am discussing are not
chosen, but evolve over time. Obviously, people cannot choose
norms when norms, by assumption, are not chosen.
27
Behavioral arguments have been more influential than choice
arguments. An example is Ellickson's claim that the cattle ranchers
he studied acknowledge a norm that "an owner of livestock is
responsible for the acts of his animals" when they trespass.
28
Ellickson suggests that the rancher is the cheaper cost-avoider than
the farmer, because while many farmers are former city dwellers
who have little expertise in fencing out animals, the rancher "can
act on his own to fence in his herd."29 This claim might be true.
Yet, it could be argued that the farmer is the cheaper cost-avoider
because she can act on her own to fence out livestock and might be
able to do so at zero marginal cost if she needs to fence out pests
anyway. She can also hire someone to build a fence if unable to do
it herself. Ellickson's argument might be correct, but the ambiguity
surrounding the evidence makes either story plausible and neither
dispositive 
0
' Ellickson adds the qualifications that norms govern "workaday" affairs and float
above a state-enforced or otherwise exogenous foundational regime that secures
property rights. See ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 174.
' They also have an incentive to choose norms that externalize costs on nonmem-
bers, an argument that will be discussed infra part II.E.
" As noted earlier, I do not discuss rules issued by private institutions. See supra
note 6. For a criticism of private law-making institutions on efficiency grounds, see
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6, at 597-98.
28 ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 53.
29Id. at 187.
"o The lack of testability of Ellickson's theory has bothered some reviewers of
Ellickson's book. See Mark Cooney, Why Is Economic Analysis So Appealing to Law
Professors?, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2211, 2222-27 (1993) (reviewing ELLICKSON, supra note
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The schematic nature of the efficiency arguments for norms
recalls the schematic nature of the efficiency arguments for
common law doctrines. The efficiency arguments for norms seem
weaker, however, perhaps because norms are even more difficult to
identify and describe than common law doctrines. So it is difficult
to test the norms against a model of efficient behavior.
This brings us to the evolutionary argument. This argument
typically assumes that because of the high cost of gathering inform-
ation, it is more efficient for transactors to model their contractual
terms on the terms used in previous transactions, rather than
determining them anew. As a result, transactions follow patterns.
Over time, some parties discover that modifications of the conven-
tional transactions generate more wealth than do the conventional
transactions. A new pattern of transacting will then crowd out the
old pattern as more people recognize its superiority and those who
do not are driven out of business. As the pattern of transacting
thus evolves toward efficiency, so do the rules that define the
pattern s.3
A variant of one of Coase's examples can be used to illustrate
this argument. Suppose that the law inefficiently holds that farmers
have the entitlement to grow their crops, unharmed, next to
railroad tracks, and that the farmers sell this entitlement to the
railroad.-2 The transfer of entitlements could hardly be called a
rule or a norm; it is a deal. But if the parties consistently renew the
deal over time, gradually the origin of an emerging pattern of
1 and stating that Ellickson's theory relies heavily on intuitive arguments that cannot
be adequately tested); Barbara Yngvesson, Beastly Neighbors: Continuing Relations in
Cattle Country, 102 YALE LJ. 1787, 1792-94 (1993) (reviewing ELLiCKSON, supra note
1 and noting that his arguments lack conclusive empirical support).
s, See, e.g., David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract
Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1858-59 (1991) (discussing the evolution of
custom toward efficiency); Epstein, Custom in Property, supra note 2, at 101-02
(discussing the role of custom and common practice in the newspaper business and
the difficulty a newspaper would face if it deviated from these norms); Epstein,
Custom in Torts, supra note 2, at 11-16 (discussing the incentives that allow custom to
succeed); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV.
261,276-79 (1985) (discussing the custom of standardization in contract formulation
to reduce error and minimize cost); see also Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach
to Norms, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1095, 1097-98 (1986) (explaining that an evolutionary
approach, which assumes that actors keep what works well and discard what does not
work well, does not rely on a rational calculation).
2 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1, 30-33 (1960)
(setting forth the railroad and farmer example in which sparks from railway engines
cause damage to the crops of farmers).
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behavior is forgotten. Farmers instinctively keep their crops far
from the tracks, and the railroads may or may not provide farmers
some return benefit."5 The efficient norm supersedes the ineffi-
cient law, transferring the entitlement to the party who values it
most.
There are some serious problems with this argument. One can
start by distinguishing the demand for norms from the supply of
norms.' Clearly, people demand efficient norms; but this demand
does not effortlessly call forth a supply. If the farmer violates a
norm and grows his crops near the tracks, the railroad will not
necessarily have the ability to punish the farmer. Norms are usually
enforced not just by the victim, but by third parties, such as the
local villagers who impose sanctions (gossip, ostracism) on those
who break the rules.3 5 But what will be the reaction of the village
gossips? If the farmer grows his crops near the tracks in violation
of a deal, the village gossips would not disapprove, or if they do, it
would not be because the farmer grows his crop near the tracks but
because he breaks his word. Indeed, when we think of norms, we
think that they succeed because whole communities believe in them
and apply them. If the farmer grows his crop near the tracks in
violation of a community norm, the village gossips would disap-
prove, regardless of whether a deal was involved. The hard question
is why the village gossips would come to feel that the new pattern
of behavior establishes a norm. To supply norms, members of a
group must, at the minimum, have an incentive to recognize rules
and sanction violators of those rules; to supply efficient norms, one
must add the additional condition that some mechanism ensures
that inefficient norms fall away and that efficient norms are
produced and sustained.
The best explanations for these phenomena can be found in the
game-theory literature. But these explanations are primitive.
Under highly restrictive conditions, patterns of cooperative behavior
arise and maintain themselves over time. The most successful
models limit themselves to two-person games, of infinite or
indeterminate length, involving players who care a great deal about
" Maybe the railroads become accustomed to giving the farmers discounts or to
traveling slowly when passing by farms to reduce the danger of hitting livestock.
s See COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 261-99 (stressing this distinction).
" I discuss this in Posner, Regulation of Groups, supra note 3, at 155-61; see also
infra part II.B (laying out the incentives that guide the norm-enforcers in their
determination of socially undesirable behavior).
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future payoffs, acting under highly stylized conditions of limited
choice.36 The extent to which these models can be extended to
more complex group behavior is not resolved. 7 Imagining that
third parties, like village gossips, play a role in the enforcement of
norms helps one see that once one abandons the unrealistic
assumption that parties have symmetrical positions, traditional
theories of the efficiency of norms lose their power.
But even a complete game-theoretic account of cooperative
behavior would miss some essential aspects of norms. We say about
most norms that people bound by them feel an emotional or
psychological compulsion to obey the norms; norms have moral
force." The compulsion might be slight or it might be overwhelm-
ing; it does not prevent people from violating a norm, necessarily,
but violation does evoke feelings of shame or guilt. Game theory
does not explain these phenomena. Explaining them requires a
psychological theory. 9 There is, however, no such psychological
38 See, e.g., DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELUNG 65-89
(1990) (discussing how cooperation can emerge in an iterated prisoner's dilemma);
see also ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 11-19 (1984) (same);
David Hirshleifer & Eric Rasmusen, Cooperation in a Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with
Ostracism, 12 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 87, 90-93 (1989) (same).
" For a recent effort, illustrating both the possibilities of resolution and the
complexity of the problem, see Michihiro Kandori, Social Norms and Community
Enforcement, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 63, 76-77 (1992).
" This observation was first made by Hume. See DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
285-94 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 3d ed. 1975) (1777) (discussing moral compulsion and
reasoningas motivatingfactors in human behavior); see also Robert D. Cooter, Against
Legal Centrism, 81 CAL. L. REV. 417,426-27 (1993) (reviewing ELLICKSON, supra note
1 and discussing the human tendency to internalize norms so that one feels morally
obligated to comply with them).
39 There have been attempts to deal with this problem. Robert Axelrod, for
example, seems to suggest that the tit-for-tat norm has an evolutionary explanation.
See AXELROD, supra note 36, at 88-105. The implication is that people obey norms
(or certain norms) because obedience to norms is *adaptive behavior. This theory,
however, has not been fully articulated. See ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN
REASON 134-45 (1988) (grounding cooperation in physiological and psychological
theories of emotion); ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION
AND WELFARE 145-47 (1986) (speculating on the psychological basis of the
inclination to obey norms); EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS
(1977) (relying on game theory to explain cooperation and coordination but failing
to explain the morally binding force of norms); Axelrod, supra note 31, at 1108-
09 (emphasizing the importance of dominance and reputation in the origin of
norms); Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 2, at 1662 (speculating on the
psychological basis of the inclination to obey norms); Hirshleifersupra note 17, at 10-
13 (discussing possible role of the biological principle of adaptation); Jack Hirsh-
leifer, On the Emotions As Guarantors of Threats and Promises, in THE LATEST AND
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theory, and none looms on the horizon.4 ° Because of the peculiar
role of psychology in the emergence of norms, an evolutionary
theory explaining the efficiency of norms is harder to imagine and
harder to test than an evolutionary theory explaining the efficiency
of statutes or of the common law, in which psychological elements
play a smaller role.
The proponents of the efficiency theory can argue that the
difficulty of developing a theory of the evolution of norms does not
prove that their arguments are wrong. They can still point to
studies that seem to show that norms in closely knit groups are
efficient. To respond to this argument, it is necessary to examine
more closely the reasons against believing that norms are likely to
be efficient.
D. Conclusion
The literature on the efficiency of the common law and of
statutes provides little support for the efficient-norms thesis. One
problem is that the literature on its own does not produce determi-
nate results. Beyond that, it does not transfer easily into the
context of norms. The institutional settings of common law
development and legislation differ too much from the institutional
settings in which norms evolve. But certain general lessons are
helpful. Most importantly, the literature on legislation and the
common law teaches that nonmarket institutions are vulnerable to
manipulation by interested parties. Norm-production more closely
resembles these institutions than it does the competitive market
where efficient outcomes can be predicted.
This discussion, however, leaves a host of unanswered questions,
especially the question of the relative efficiency of these different
rule-producing mechanisms. To answer this question, we must
analyze in more detail the problems with norm-production, the
subject of the next Part.
THE BEST 307, 322 (John Dupre ed., 1987) [hereinafter Hirshleifer, Emotions]
(emphasizing the importance of ingrained emotional drives such as rage and gratitude
in producing cooperation); Philip Pettit, Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perpectives,
100 ETHICS 725, 730 (1990) (assuming that most people want to avoid being subject
to even the covert disapproval of others and that it is costless to disapprove of deviant
behavior covertly); cf. RUSSELL HARDIN, ONE FOR ALL 86-88 (1995) (speculating on
how norms emerge but acknowledging the difficulty of the question).
40 See ELSTER, supra note 23, at 8-11; see also Jon Elster, Norms of Revenge, 100
ETHICS 862, 872-76 (1990) (rejecting rational choice explanations of revenge).
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II. THE CAUSES OF INEFFICIENT NORMS
This Part discusses the reasons why inefficient norms might
exist. One can sharpen the focus, and finesse the question of how
norms arise, by investigating the conditions under which a norm
that is efficient at time 0 might persist even after a change of
conditions renders it inefficient at time 1. This discussion is limited
to norms that arise within close-knit groups, although, for reasons
that will become clear, I waffle a bit on what "close-knit" means.
A. Information Costs and Lags
Suppose a group has an efficient norm at time 0: For example,
in a small community the farmers have the right to grow crops close
to the tracks; the (local) railroad has an obligation to pay for
damages arising from fires; and the farmers are the more efficient
users of the space near the tracks. Assume also that all members of
this group have roughly equal endowments and can easily observe
each other's behavior. The railroad installs spark guards because
the cost of being ostracized for starting fires exceeds the cost of the
spark guards. By time 1, the norm becomes inefficient as a result
of technological or economic changes, such as variations in the cost
of crop-growing and spark-guarding.
As discussed earlier, the farmer might sell his entitlement to the
railroad. As a result, the farmer stops growing crops near the tracks
and the efficient result is obtained. But, as pointed out above,
4'
the fact that the parties reach a deal does not mean that the old
norm (granting the farmer the entitlement) will change to a new
norm (granting the railroad the entitlement), even though the new
norm would have saved the parties the transaction costs of making
the deal in the first place. This is important because the value of
the norm lies in its regulation of the behavior of everyone, including
potential entrants (such as new farmers and new railroads), and in
its ability to invoke the power of third parties for the purpose of
sanctioning violations. The village gossips may or may not approve
of the deal, but there is no reason to believe that they would change
their minds about the older norm. We need a mechanism to
explain why the new efficient norm would arise.
The theory discussed in the prior Part suggests that the farmer
and the railroad would abide by the deal for such a long time that
41 See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
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gradually the village gossips would forget about the old norm and
accept the new pattern of behavior as reflective of a new norm
(perhaps without even realizing that this norm or the pattern of
behavior is new).42 Still, this story must be highly unsatisfactory
for the believer in efficient norms. For during the period of
transition the reigning norm is an inefficient one. Furthermore,
one would expect that even as the old norm is gradually replaced by
the new norm, continuing changes in the economy and in technol-
ogy will render even the emerging new norm inefficient.
The problem is that it is unlikely that the village gossips could
discover the change in relative costs as quickly as the farmer and
railroad. Even if one assumes that the village gossips would or
could change the norms if they had this information-an assumption
that is questioned later in this Article-the passage of time during
which they acquire this information represents a period during
which inefficient norms prevail. Inevitably, the norms of any group
will lag behind changes in the environment and technology,
although one can argue about the extent of this lag for any given
group.
Consider, for example, Harold Demsetz's theory of the develop-
ment of property rights in land among native tribes in Canada.
Demsetz argues that this system arose as a result of the demand for
furs by French traders. Prior to this demand, there was no
common-pool problem because furs were produced naturally at a
rate great enough to satisfy the natives' needs. Once the traders
arrived and began to offer valuables for furs, however, each native
gained an incentive to seize animals at a much higher rate. This
produced a common-pool problem: no one had an incentive to
ensure that the furs remained a renewable resource. But the natives
responded collectively to this problem by allotting land to different
hunting groups, whose continuing interest in that land presumably
prevented them from over-exploiting it."
Demsetz's theory may be correct. But note that the system of
property rights did not emerge until the middle of the 1700s.
44
Fur trading had begun in the early 1500s and had reached signifi-
42 See supra text accompanying note 31.
43 See HAROLD DEMSETZ, OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, AND THE FIRM 107-09 (1988).
Demsetz relies for his data mainly on Eleanor Leacock, The Montagnais "Hunting
Territory"and the Fur Trade, 56 AM. ANTHRoPoLocisT, Oct. 1954, Memoir No. 78, at
1-17.
44 See DEMSETZ, supra note 43, at 109 (citing Leacock, supra note 43, at 15).
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cant proportions by the middle of the 1500S. 45 Thus, the efficient
norm may have lagged by two centuries.4 State intervention at any
time in the interim (if it had been possible) would have promoted
efficiency.
Information lag is a simple reason why judges and legislators
may produce better rules than groups. No doubt it takes time for
information to reach legislators and judges, just as it takes time for
information to reach members of a group. Nonetheless, legislators
and judges are specialists at obtaining and processing information;
further, they have the means and the motive to establish institutions
that obtain and process information. Assuming that legislators and
judges are properly motivated to choose the welfare-maximizing
rules that are, according to the proponents of efficient-norms
theories, reflected in the development of norms-an assumption that
will be examined later-the lag problem afflicts norm-production
more severely than it afflicts statute- and doctrine-production.
B. Strategic Behavior
Norms are rules that govern collective behavior and that are
enforced nonlegally. One might imagine that enforcers, such as the
village gossips, simply "apply" a norm to a given behavior, determin-
ing whether or not to punish the actor depending on whether the
behavior violates a norm. But a moment's reflection should reveal
that this description is incomplete. If the gossips apply an already
existing norm, that leaves open the questions of where and how that
norm originated. It seems more likely that in approving or
disapproving conduct, the enforcers rely mainly on a sense ofjustice
or of the general good, which may or may not also involve the
vindication of preexisting norms. After the enforcers sanction a
person, actors generalize the sanctioning in the form of a rule, and
this rule can be understood as a norm that guides future behavior.
Suppose, for example, that the railroad's trains emit sparks. The
village gossips must decide whether to punish this behavior. In
making this decision, they may rely on their sense of the general
good of the community, but not-at least not necessarily-on
whether they have already recognized a norm against the emission
s See Leacock, supra note 43, at 10.
4 It might also have changed overnight; such is the nature of the evidence. But
Leacock says that before 1670, furs in some areas were "seriously depleted." Leacock,
supra note 43, at 12 (suggesting that the common-pool problem had emerged no
fewer than 30 years before the advent of this property-rights regime).
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of sparks. The gossips' reaction can then be interpreted as the
creation or application of a rule or norm (for example, "trains may
not emit sparks onto crops") that maximizes the value of collective
behavior (railroad transportation contiguous to farming). Actors
determine their future conduct in light of the norm, for example,
by installing spark guards in order to avoid punishment. The
question we want to investigate now is what incentives the gossips
have to decide that some behavior is socially undesirable and to
punish a person for engaging in that behavior.
47
To set the stage for an answer to this question, it is useful
to consider a simpler case, where cooperative behavior occurs even
in the absence of third-party enforcers such as the gossips. Such
two-party enforcement is often analyzed as a "coordination game,"
while multi-party enforcement can be analyzed as a "prisoner's
dilemma."
48
In a standard version of the coordination game, each player,
faced with a choice between two different moves, does better if both
make the same move than if each player makes a different move.
49
For example, two cars approaching each other on a highway in the
era before traffic laws do better if they both choose the move, "pass
on the right" (or "pass on the left"), and neither car improves its
position by trying to choose a move different from what the other
party chooses. The crucial point about coordination games is that
as long as each player knows about a convention (for example,
"always pass on the right"), neither has an incentive to deviate from
it.
In a prisoner's dilemma, each player does better by cheating if
the other cooperates, and each player does better by cheating if the
other player cheats. Thus, whether or not one player knows the
strategy of the other player, each has an incentive to cheat. For
example, each member of a striking union has an incentive to cross
the picket line, whether or not other members cross the picket line.
The reason is that if the others maintain the line, then the violator
"' In suggesting some answers to this question, I can only scratch the surface of
a subtle and complex literature on the evolution of norms. See, e.g., SUGDEN, supra
note 39 (providing a game-theoretic account of the evolution of norms); ULLMANN-
MARGALIr, supra note 39 (same); Hirshleifer, supra note 17, at 41-49 (same).
"' For an introduction to these and related concepts, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET
AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994).
" I simplify considerably: coordination games can also involve different but
symmetrical moves. But this complication is not necessary for my analysis. For a
discussion of these games, see SUODEN, supra note 39, at 34-54.
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obtains both the benefits the union obtains for its members (a
better collective bargaining agreement) and the benefit of being
able to work during the strike; if the others do not maintain the
line, then the violator obtains nothing by striking by himself and so
might as well go to work. The prisoner's dilemma is that because
of private incentives, all actors cheat, but they do worse by cheating
than they would if everyone cooperated.
Whether the coordination game or the prisoner's dilemma
better represents the structure of collective behavior depends on
context. The norms that arose to govern vehicular traffic are
thought to have solved roadway coordination problems. The "right"
move may be for both people to drive on the right (as in the U.S.)
or both to drive on the left (as in England), but no one has an
incentive to make the wrong move once the norm has become clear.
In contrast, the norms that govern participation in a picket line
solve a prisoner's dilemma. The "right" move is to join the picket
line, but everyone has an incentive to cheat and cross the picket
line-whether or not everyone else also cheats. The norm for traffic,
once everyone knows the rule, is self-enforcing, since violation
directly injures the violator as well as the victim. Enforcement of the
norm for picket lines depends, even after everyone knows the rule,
on everyone sanctioning everyone else, since violation in the
absence of a risk of sanction benefits the violator.
The distinction between coordination games and prisoner's
dilemmas is important because they have different implications for
the likelihood that norms will evolve to solve a problem of collective
behavior and the likelihood that the norms that evolve will be
optimal (relative to laws that the state could supply).
As Robert Sugden and others have shown, under plausible
conditions, coordination norms are likely to evolve in communities
in which people have repeated contact with each other.5" In the
long run, as people experiment with strategies and gradually
discover that certain moves are more likely to be beneficial than
other moves, the coordinating strategies drive out the others. For
example, a strategy of "always drive on the right" will crowd out
strategies of always driving on the east side of the street or the
north side of the street, because those who choose the first strategy
will suffer fewer accidents (just with the second group) than those
' See id. at 42 (discussing the conditions under which norms will emerge among
people who engage in repeated interactions); Hirshleifer, supra note 17, at 33-38
(same).
1996] 1715
1716 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 1697
who choose the latter (with the first group and each other).5 As
between the norm of driving on the right and the norm of driving
on the left, the norm that prevails will generally be the one that,
through chance, most people initially obey.
But neither Sugden nor anyone else claims that the prevailing
norms are necessarily optimal. Sugden, for example, argues that the
norms that prevail will be ones that exploit "focal points," features
of the environment that are psychologically salient.52 Consider his
argument that a norm of possession solves a coordination game
respecting who, as between two strangers, has the right to exploit a
given bundle of resources. The possession norm states that the
person with possession plays the aggressive move, while the person
without possession plays the passive move. In contrast, under
anarchy, each party decides to play an aggressive or passive strategy
without knowing in advance the strategy that the other party will
play. The possession norm yields gains over anarchy because it
allows the parties to avoid the worst case of mutual aggression.
s
Although the possession norm improves the position of parties
relative to anarchy, legal rules improve their position relative to the
possession norm. The problem with the possession norm is that it
does not protect property in which a person has invested resources
but cannot overtly possess-for example, large areas of land or
chattels that are best used by third parties. The natural solution to
this problem is a recording system, such as those used for real estate
transactions and security interests in personal property. But a
recording system cannot evolve through the spontaneous reactions
of the village gossips; it must be created by an agency, such as a
legislature.54
Now consider collective action that is subject to the prisoner's
dilemma. In this case, the norm (for example, "stand in the picket
51 A critical mass has to be achieved. For details see SUGDEN, supra note 39, at 51.
52 See id. at 47-52; see also Robert Sugden, Spontaneous OrderJ. ECON. PERSP., Fall
1989, at 85, 97 (stating that patterns of behavior evolve simply "because they are
more successful at replicating themselves" and concluding that "[tihey do not serve
any overarching social purpose" and are not "necessarily efficient"). The concept of
the focal point originated with Schelling. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY
OF CONFLICT 53-80,83-118 (1980) (examining the role of focal points in coordination
when communication is impossible).
53 SUGDEN, supra note 39, at 55-62, 166-67; Hirshleifer, supra note 17, at 16.
' Courts can develop rules, but it seems clear that legislatures have done a better
job. Compare Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code with the tangle ofjudge-
made doctrines it replaced. For descriptions, see generally GRANT GILMORE,
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (1965).
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line" or "do not emit sparks onto crops") is not self-creating or self-
enforcing because the demanded behavior is too complex to be
governed by focal points and because actors have no incentive to
cooperate in the manner the focal points, if they existed, would
demand.
To see why, think of the main obligations of the norm-enforcers.
Each must determine the social utility of the unacceptable behavior
in question and punish individuals who engage in that behavior,
supposing it is socially costly. In the farmer-railroad example, the
village gossips must individually incur the cost of deciding whether
the railroad's emission of sparks is socially costly behavior; then,
each must individually incur the cost of sanctioning the railroad
(supposing the behavior is socially costly) by refusing to do business
with the railroad. Whereas in coordination games deviation from
the desired rule results in automatic punishment (such as a car
accident), in prisoner's dilemmas deviation results in punishment
only if the enforcers take the trouble to act.
The enforcers have strong incentives not to act in the optimal
way. Suppose plausibly that each enforcer has some, but not
complete, information about the social costs and benefits of spark
emission and that the information aggregated is more accurate than
the information disaggregated. If the social context is such that
each gossip simultaneously and independently acts upon his
decision (by, for example, ostracizing the railroad), then the benefits
of aggregation are lost. If the social context is such that the gossips
discuss their views before acting (by, for example, gossiping), then
the problem of herd behavior arises:55 Because a gossip receives
the benefits of information aggregation whether or not he makes a
contribution, he has an incentive to follow a leader rather than to
incur the cost of coming to an independent judgment (including a
loss of reputation or other sanction if he is wrong). But this gives
the leader's decision too much weight (as he has only partial
' See Abhijit V. Benerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J. ECON. 797,798
(1992) (defining "herd behavior" as "everyone doing what everyone else is doing, even
when their private information suggests doing something quite different" and
concluding that such behavior leads to suboptimal resource allocation); Sushil
Bikhchandani et al., A Theoty of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change As
Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. EcON. 992, 994 (1992) (stating that "fa]n
informational cascade occurs when it is optimal for an individual, having observed the
actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual
without regard to his own information" and using this theory to explain "rapid and
short-lived fluctuations such as fads, fashions, booms, and crashes").
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information, by assumption), and leads to a failure of aggrega-
tion.56
This information problem exists even if all the gossips know that
the railroad's behavior is socially costly. The problem exists because
even if they know that the behavior is socially costly, they might not
know that everyone else knows this. For fear that others will
incorrectly sanction the person who makes the first move, everyone
has an incentive not to act. And a further pathology arises because
even when everyone knows that the behavior is socially costly, and
everyone knows that everyone knows this, each actor will be
reluctant to incur the cost of sanctioning the railroad. If sanction-
ing the railroad means ostracizing it, then the sanctioner as well as
the railroad lose a business opportunity. The prisoner's dilemma
reproduces itself at every level of sanctioning behavior.
It might seem that it would be impossible for the gossips to
overcome these prisoner's dilemmas, but experience suggests
otherwise.57  It seems more likely that the prisoner's dilemmas
affect behavior on the margin, indicating (1) that norm-production
will be based on a suboptimal use of available information because
of failures of information aggregation; and (2) that it will suffer
from a great deal of variance because of herd behavior.
The creation of legislation and judicial doctrine is also subject
to strategic behavior, but it is important to distinguish the way their
creation is subject to strategic behavior from the way norm-
production is. Common to all three forms of rule-production is
their vulnerability to attempts by people to exert pressure on the
decisionmakers to create rules that favor their private interests.
Legislatures are vulnerable to the pressures of lobbyists. Courts are
vulnerable to the pressures of repeat litigators. And norm produc-
ers are vulnerable to the pressures of interested members of a
group. For example, the farmers have powerful incentives to try to
convince or even force the village gossips not to condemn the old
and inefficient pro-farmer norm because the farmers are not
compensated for the redistribution to the railroad caused by the
recognition of the new and efficient pro-railroad norm. It might be
' This problem resembles that of network effects. For discussions, see DOUGLAS
G. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 48, at 208-13; Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate
Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 772-824 (1995). Cf. Goetz & Scott,
supra note 31, at 276-79, 286-89 (discussing how network effects influence contract
default rules).
s' For a discussion, see Posner, Regulation of Groups, supra note 3, at 137-44.
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the case that norm producers are more resistant to these public-
choice-type pressures-that they are more responsive to the general
interest than are legislatures and courts-but that argument is
difficult and it is not the focus of this analysis.
My argument has focused on the mechanisms by which prefer-
ences for various rules are transformed into a rule that actually
governs behavior, be it a statute, doctrine, or norm. With respect
to the effectiveness of these mechanisms, the three forms of rule
production clearly differ. All three institutions solve coordination
games just by publicizing the strategies that are most common. But
legislatures, more so than courts, and courts, more so than norm-
producers, are less dependent on the preexistence of focal points.
Legislatures can create focal points (as through the recording
system) with which actors can coordinate their behavior, whereas
norm-producers must take focal points as given features of the
psychological or social environment. Good norms depend on
luck.58
In addition, whereas norm-producers have powerful incentives
to free-ride when aggregating information and inflicting sanctions,
legislatures and courts have institutional mechanisms that mitigate
these prisoner's dilemmas. Legislatures use committees for
aggregating information and voting rules for preventing the first-
move problems discussed above. Courts rely on rules of evidence,
appeal, and precedent to aggregate information and judgments and
to minimize variance. None of these mechanisms is perfect; but
they seem to be straightforward improvements over the anarchy of
norm-production, where no institutional mechanism prevents free-
riding in the aggregation of information and the enforcement of
sanctions, and where the actors are nonspecialists, whose incentives
to cooperate depend on their ever-varying opportunity costs.
59
When collective behavior depends heavily on information aggrega-
tion-as opposed to when enforcers can adequately rely on private
information-legislatures and courts can be expected to use
information more effectively in determining rules so that statutes
and the common law are substantively superior, clearer, and more
stable than norms.
' This fact is clear from Schelling's examples, where, for instance, the success of
the parachutists in finding each other depends on whether there happens to be one
crossroads rather than two, and so on. See SCHELUING, supra note 52, at 54-58.
9 Whether and how the gossips enforce norms depends, for example, on whether
they happen to be employed at the time the violator acts.
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C. Morality
Norms often reflect nonefficiency and, more generally, non-
consequentialist values. This can be seen by reflecting on the ways
in which the railroad might try to convince the community to
abandon an old norm. The railroad might argue that the norm
granting the entitlement to the farmer is not welfare-maximizing.
One can imagine a number of responses. Some people would
exhibit a kind of unreflective intuitionism, arguing that the existing
structure of entitlements is simply "right." Traditionalists would
appeal to the authority of age: the entitlement is proper because
the entitlement is grounded in history. Some people would invoke
ideals of distributive justice: the farmer deserves the entitlement
because he is poorer than the railroad. Deontologists would argue
that the existing structure of entitlements is proper because the
train is the cause of the fire; in contrast, the farmer is passive.
Some moralists, especially deontologists, would not object to a
contract in which the railroad purchased the entitlement from the
farmer, but would still insist on the propriety of the initial ineffi-
cient allocation of entitlements. Others, especially intuitionists,
might both object to such a contract and insist on the propriety of
the inefficient allocation of entitlements. Although to varying
degrees, all of the moral arguments sustain the inefficient norm and
inhibit welfare-maximizing behavior.
It might be argued that apparently inefficient norms that reflect
moral, rather than economic, concerns are not really inefficient. If
moral attachment to an old norm prevents its transformation in
response to economic changes, that might signal that the psychic
loss that would result from abandonment of the old norm exceeds
the material gain that would result from adoption of the new norm.
But, as will be seen, there is no reason to believe that the psychic
loss is greater than the material gain; moreover, under some
conditions, state intervention can transform norms so that the
material gain can be obtained without any psychic loss.
60
One would also expect moral values to influence statutes and
common law doctrines. The important distinction is that legislators
and judges face constraints against allowing their own moral feelings
to influence their law-making; norm-producers face no such
constraints. Legislators are constrained by their desire for reelec-
tion and thus by the interests of constituents. Judges are con-
See infra part III.B.2.
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strained by precedent and the requirement of reasoned decision-
making. The importance of this distinction will become clear in
Part III.
D. Envy
An envious person incurs disutility when others possess
something that the envious person cannot have. The envious
person may therefore incur costs to prevent those others from
obtaining that good.61
In our example, envy of the railroads may prevent people from
abandoning the old, inefficient norm that grants the entitlement to
the farmers-even if the people recognize that the norm is outdated.
Because they do not want the already rich railroad to become even
richer, they continue to condemn the railroad every time it causes
a fire.
Envious people, unlike deontologists and distributivists, but
perhaps like intuitionists and traditionalists, would object to
attempts by the railroad and the farmer to contract around the old,
inefficient norm, because the contract would make the railroad
better off. Envious people also, unlike distributivists, would not
care whether the old norm helped the farmers or not. Finally,
envious people, unlike intuitionists and traditionalists, would seek
to change an old, efficient norm into an inefficient one if the new
norm injured the objects of their envy. Accordingly, envy can
produce even more inefficient norms than does morality.
It might be argued that if one takes into account the envy of
observers, even apparently inefficient norms are really efficient, just
as inefficient norms become efficient if one takes into account the
moral feelings of observers. But again, envy can prevent the
evolution of efficient norms by giving certain people motives to
resist change, even if change would increase total wealth. It might
61 See GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 285-92 (enlarged ed. 1991)
(stating that "[a]n effective envier wants to maximize his envy income and takes all
actions that raise the difference between his own income and the incomes of [his]
victims" and asserting that such an envier "would be willing to lower his income if
[the victims'] incomes were lowered more"); ELSTER, supra note 23, at 252 (stating
that "[t]he basic source of envy is that when we attempt to take stock of ourselves, the
first impulse is to look at others"); FRANK, supra note 39, at 15 (noting that "people
who feel envious will accept different jobs, earn different salaries ... and vote for
different laws than predicted by self-interest models"); Richard H. McAdams, Relative
Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 14-18 (1992) (discussing the theory that because of envy,
an increase in societal income may not result in increased welfare).
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be the case that the envious can be paid off out of the surplus or
that the envied could give up some of their wealth, but this is not
necessarily the case.
The role of envy in the legislative and judicial arenas is
restricted in interesting ways. An argument in which one appeals
nakedly to envy will not be taken seriously in those settings.
Arguments based on envy must be disguised as arguments grounded
in authentic doctrinal, moral, or economic considerations. The
reformulation of an argument in this way is a cost, albeit sometimes
a trivial one. Since public argument plays a greater role in
legislative and judicial action than in norm-generation, envy may
have less influence on statutes and common law doctrines than on
norms.
E. Negative Externalities
Norms may be socially inefficient when they support activities
that injure third parties. A criminal gang's norm of loyalty is
socially inefficient if it enables the gang to commit crimes effective-
ly. A cartel's norm governing price-fixing is socially inefficient if it
enables the cartel to fix prices. An aristocracy's norms of exclusion
are socially inefficient if they limit the availability of offices and
other privileges to aristocrats and exclude more skilled citizens.
6 2
Not all negative externalities are so obvious and thus not all
socially inefficient norms are readily identifiable. Richard Arnott
and Joseph Stiglitz note that when failures in the insurance market
cause people to seek insurance in close-knit social groups, the
provision of insurance by these groups may further unravel the
insurance market.6" Accordingly, the norms that govern the group
62 See HARDIN, supra note 39, at 72-106 (discussing norms of exclusion).
' See Richard Arnott &Joseph E. Stiglitz, Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions:
Dysfunctional Crowding Out orPeer Monitoring?, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 179, 179-81 (1991).
The argument begins with the observation that insurance companies do not meet the
demand for insurance because of moral hazard. Because the insurers cannot observe
all of the insured's actions and thus make the insurance premium a function of care,
the insured has an incentive to engage in reckless behavior. Insurance companies can
mitigate this problem by refusing to provide full insurance, requiring the insured to
bear some of the risk himself. As a consequence of the undersupply of insurance,
however, the insured has an incentive to seek out additional insurance from other,
nonmarket sources, such as families, religious groups, and social networks. If the
members of the nonmarket group do not monitor each other effectively, the insured
will act carelessly (as a result of being fully insured), the total number of accidents will
rise, higher costs will be borne by market insurers, and a reduction in market
insurance will result. Since people must then rely to a greater degree on nonmarket
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might be inefficient.
Groups have a stronger incentive to adopt or develop norms
that externalize costs than those that merely maximize joint welfare
without producing negative externalities. Therefore, one should be
wary about assuming that group norms are efficient. In contrast,
statutes and common law doctrines cover largejurisdictions and can
be challenged by anyone within those jurisdictions who is injured by
them. Because the jurisdiction of a legislature or a court is larger
than the jurisdiction of a small, closely knit group, the legislatures
and courts have less powerful incentives to externalize costs. Of
course, the large size of the populations governed by state agencies
means that some individuals will have no incentive to protest laws
that injure them slightly, leading to attempts by interest groups to
obtain redistributive laws. It is not obvious, however, that the
optimal balancing of this disadvantage with the advantage of size
leads to a conclusion that small groups, rather than legislatures or
courts, produce the superior rules.
F. A Note on Biology and Social Norms
Some scholars argue that norms have a biological source. Some
or many norms prevail because of emotional propensities produced
by genetic structures subject to evolutionary pressures." In
support of this view, some norms appears to prevail in all known
cultures, including norms against murder and rape, norms demand-
ing greater loyalty between family members than between strangers,
and so on. 5 While the universality of these norms may reflect the
universality of certain social or economic constraints (such as
scarcity), they may also reflect universal aspects of human nature.
If some norms have biological origins, the believer in the
efficiency of norms must provide a biological argument for the
efficiency of norms. Such an argument would presumably draw on
evolutionary biology in order to show that efficient norms are
adaptive. Such an argument would face substantial difficulties.
First, most human evolution occurred during a period when
economic, demographic, environmental, technological, and other
insurers, which are poorer risk-poolers, total welfare declines. If the nonmarket
insurer is an efficient risk-monitor, however, aggregate wealth would rise. See id.
64 See generally Francois Nielsen, Sociobiology and Sociology, 20 ANN. REV. Soc. 267,
291-92 (discussing evolutionary theories of colletive action).
65 See DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS 1 (1991) (arguing that "there [are]
generalizations ... that really do hold for the wide array of human populations").
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conditions differed from those that prevail today. The supporter of
efficient norms would have to explain how norms that evolved in
primitive conditions would be efficient in modern society." This
is a variation of the lag problem.6 7 If norms that are efficient at
time 0 are hard-wired into the brain, then they must persist at time
1, when environmental conditions have changed.
Second, it is widely recognized that evolutionary forces may
produce maladaptive traits. An example is the peacock's tail, which
results from competition for mates, but decreases the survivability
of the population as a whole.6" As an analogue, consider norms
that require family loyalty over loyalty to a larger political group.
Interfamily competition within a group, such as a tribe, may favor
families that develop strict norms of family loyalty, but these same
norms may weaken the survivability of the group. If evolution
produces maladaptive traits, then it might also produce maladaptive
norms.
69
G. Conclusion
The preceding sections have shown that norms are likely to be
"inefficient," in the sense that while they enable people to cooperate
for the purpose of producing a collective good, they do not enable
them to exploit the full cooperative surplus that would exist if
cooperation were costless. 0 In addition, the preceding sections
' Think of the norms of aid and usury that evolved under primitive conditions.
See ELSTER, supra note 23, at 149-50.
See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
6 See Hirshleifer, supra note 17, at 11-13.69 A related source of inefficient norms is cognitive error, about which much is
already written. See, e.g., ELUCKSON, supra note 1, at 104-20 (discussing the sources
of the cattlemen's false belief that in automobile-cattle collisions, motorists are strictly
liable for injuries to cattle in open ranges and cattlemen are strictly liable for injuries
to motorists in closed ranges, while noting that negligence principles govern both
types of disputes).
0 The argument has focused on "substantive" norms, that is, norms that directly
govern cooperative behavior. Ellickson identifies other sorts of norms, such as
"procedural" norms, which govern the process by which groups modify substantive
norms, and "enforcement" norms, which govern the process by which groups enforce
substantive norms. See ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 132-36. He argues that the
efficiency of a substantive norm cannot be analyzed in isolation. A group chooses
norms to maximize its welfare so that, for example, the optimal procedural norms
might sometimes prevent the group from choosing the most efficient substantive
norm, as when it is too costly to identify the latter. See id. at 173-74. Although my
argument has focused on substantive norms, it applies equally to any other sort of
norm. All kinds of norms must evolve. The processes that hinder the efficient
evolution of substantive norms also hinder the efficient evolution of procedural,
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have shown that the state can, in theory, produce laws that enable
people to obtain a larger share of the potential cooperative surplus
than they would be able to achieve through private creation and
enforcement of norms. The reason is that, given a demand for a
particular collective good, the state has access to institutional
mechanisms that aggregate information, achieve coordination, and
minimize opportunism more effectively than do private mechanisms.
The prior analysis discusses the efficiency of private versus state
mechanisms in translating a given set of preferences for rules into
a set of rules that are actually enforced as norms or laws. It does
not discuss in detail how one set of preferences rather than another
set of preferences comes to influence the mechanism. It is possible
that state mechanisms reflect the preferences of citizens poorly, as
the public-choice model of statutes suggests, more poorly than do
private mechanisms. But it seems just as possible that private
mechanisms do as poor a job as state mechanisms-because, for
example, the more powerful members of a group have more
influence on the creation and enforcement of norms than the less
powerful, but more numerous, members. As previously discussed,
because legislation is more centralized than norm-production, the
process of rule creation is likely to be more streamlined and
effective; however, this feature of legislation may make it less
responsive than norm-production to the interests of those governed
by the rules. A theory that accounted for these influences would be
considerably more complex than the theory I present here.
But before the present analysis is completed, more must be said
about the ways in which the state can influence behavior. By
uncovering both the advantages and problems of state regulation of
behavior, a more adequate comparison of state and private creation
of rules can be made.
III. THE STATE'S RESPONSE TO INEFFICIENT NORMS
A welfare-maximizing state should try to change inefficient
norms where it finds them, or at least provide mechanisms that
blunt their impact. But two problems emerge. First, how can the
state discover whether a norm is inefficient? This problem arises
from the fact that usually the group's members, not the state, have
the best information about the optimal form of collective action.
enforcement, and other kinds of norms.
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Second, even if the state can discover whether a norm is inefficient,
the proper legal response may be difficult to determine.
Part A discusses the problem of identifying inefficient norms.
Part B discusses three approaches to the problem of dealing with
inefficient norms. First, under the "norm-violation" approach, the
state overrides inefficient norms by enacting laws that provide
incentives for people to violate those norms. Second, under the
"norm-transformation" approach, the state transforms inefficient
norms by giving groups incentives to modify those norms or by
influencing individuals' attitudes toward behavior the state seeks to
promote or suppress. Third, under the "norm-circumvention"
approach, the state facilitates attempts by parties to bargain around
inefficient norms.
A. Identfying Inefficient Norms
The state can identify inefficient norms in a variety of ways.
The following list suggests some possibilities.
First, group members may tell agents of the state that the norms
are inefficient and that state intervention is desired. For example,
users of a common pool sometimes seek legislation or consent
decrees to give legal effect to an agreement they have worked out
for themselves.7 The problems with relying on self-reporting are
(1) group members may be mistaken about a norm's efficiency and
(2) group members may claim that efficient norms are inefficient in
order to obtain state assistance in erecting entry barriers.
Second, the existence of extensive bargaining around a norm is
evidence that the norm may be inefficient. For example, sometimes
people in communities with strong norms against usury bargain
around the norms by disguising loans as sales.7 2 A problem is that
people may bargain around efficient norms when the norms protect
third parties from negative externalities. Another problem is that
some norms that stimulate bargaining because they do not reflect
71 See, e.g., FLINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES
284-89 (1994) (discussing efforts by water users in California basins to obtainjudicial
and legislative approval of their agreements).
' See Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconsciona-
bility Doctrine, Usuty Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 283, 312-14 (1995) (discussing the persistence of usury ceilings in 17th,
18th, and 19th century England and parties' attempts to contract around the usury
ceiling).
INEFFICIENT NORMS
average preferences may enhance efficiency by forcing the disclo-
sure of information."7
Third, rapid economic or technological change may suggest that
unchanged norms have become inefficient. Medical innovations
with respect to public health, contraception, and surrogacy may
have outstripped norms regarding adoption and other child-related
practices. The state, however, is not necessarily better at under-
standing economic and technological trends than are private groups.
Fourth, highly unequal endowments of group members may be
evidence of inefficient norms. The more powerful members may
prefer and enforce norms that redistribute wealth to them, even
when those norms are inefficient.
7 4
Fifth, the state, as a result of its ability to exploit economies of
scale in the collection and analysis of information, may detect
actual or potential inefficiencies before the group does. For
example, the state may recognize-from trends extrapolated from
other fisheries-that a particular fishery is heading toward depletion
before that fishery's own management does.
This brief list gives a flavor of the opportunities and problems
of state intervention. A further problem should be mentioned, if
only in passing. Whether a norm should be considered "inefficient"
cannot be determined in isolation; the norm must be analyzed in
connection with related norms. For example, suppose a community
has an inefficient norm that permits violent resolution of disputes-a
norm of honor. It might seem that the state could identify this
norm as inefficient and take steps to change it.75 But the norm of
honor is related to other norms, such as a norm that favors self-help
over cooperation (so that conflicts are frequent) or a norm against
government interference (whereby people disapprove of police
interference with violent resolution of disputes). It is possible that
to achieve the collective good of more peaceful resolution of
disputes, transformation of one or both of these latter two norms
would be cheaper than transformation of the norm of honor. Thus,
the state's attempt to identify "the" inefficient norm may be very
difficult.
76
" Cf Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theoy of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97-100 (1989) (discussing how
contract rules may promote efficiency by forcing parties to disclose information
through bargaining).
74 For an example from the common pools literature, see infra text accompanying
note 117.
See my discussion of dueling, infra part IV.A.
76 1 thank Cass Sunstein for raising this point with me. See Cass Sunstein, Social
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B. Legal Responses to Inefficient Norms
1. Norm-Violation
The state can diminish the influence of inefficient norms by
enacting laws that give parties incentives to violate them. Returning
to Coase's example, suppose that the prevailing norm inefficiently
assigns the entitlement to the railroad. In practice, this might mean
that when sparks set fire to crops, farmers' complaints fall on deaf
ears. The state could enact a law providing farmers with the right
to sue the railroad for damages arising from such fires. 7
The effects of this law may vary. On the one hand, the village
gossips might hound farmers who exercise their right of action. If
the costs from loss of reputation that result exceed the value of
saving the crops, the farmers would not sue. The new law would
have no effect. On the other hand, the village gossips might not
care if the farmers exercise their right of action. Moreover, even if
farmers who use this right do sustain reputational damages, the
state can overcome this disincentive by making the award sufficient-
ly generous.
The reaction of the village gossips depends on both their
reasons for supporting the old norm and their interpretation of the
state's intervention. Welfare-maximizing gossips would not ostracize
the farmers for exercising their rights of action if they assumed that
the state's intervention was based on efficiency considerations they
had not perceived or if they believed that the state's intervention
overcame problems of strategic behavior they could not solve on
their own. But the same gossips might ostracize the farmers if they
assumed (incorrectly, under this hypothesis) that the state's
intervention was wrong. Traditionalists and intuitionists would
ostracize the farmers for exercising their rights of action. Converse-
ly, envious or distributivist gossips would not ostracize the farmers
under such a scenario provided that the railroad was wealthier than
the farmer.
A further consideration concerns the visibility of the norm-
breaking behavior and the costliness of imposing sanctions. It
might be costless for the village gossips to ignore the farmers'
Norms and SocialRoles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming May 1996) (manuscript at 53-
54).
" Other examples include the criminalization of duels in the face of the powerful
norms supporting them and the prohibition of traditional practices respecting
common-pool resources. See infra parts IV.A to IV.B.
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complaints prior to the creation of the new right of action; but it
might also be costly to ostracize farmers who exercise the new right
of action because ostracism involves giving up valuable business
opportunities.
A final consideration is that if the state encourages people to
violate the norm through rewards and penalties, the force of the
norm may decline, for two reasons. First, as discussed in more
detail subsequently, if people attach independent moral force to
actions by the state, then the force of the norm for many people will
in part be a function of the state's approval of it. Second, the force
of the norm for many people may be a function of the number of
people who obey it. While many people may initially prefer to obey
the norm rather than comply with the law, others may attach a
greater degree of importance to the state sanction. Once this latter
group violates the norm, the force of the norm declines for the core
group who were initially loyal to the norm and they violate it as
well. In this way, a norm may unravel.78
The efficiency implications of these considerations are straight-
forward. The use of rewards and penalties to encourage people to
violate norms will enhance efficiency if the increase in social wealth
achieved through the change in behavior exceeds the state's
administrative costs and the psychic costs to those who continue to
value the norm. The existence and amount of the increase in social
wealth depend on the legal sanction being powerful enough to
overcome countervailing nonlegal sanctions. The amount of psychic
cost depends on the kind and intensity of moral values held by
observers.
2. Norm-Transformation
Another way that the state can encourage efficient behavior in
the face of inefficient norms is by effecting a change in the norms
themselves. Two methods are possible: First, the state could seek
to convince actors that the norms are inefficient or otherwise
" This has an analogy in the heuristic of social proof, according to which people
take other people's beliefs as evidence of the truth of the belief. This phenomenon
can convert a rumor into a conviction and can shield widespread, but mistaken,
beliefs from rational argument. See ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE NEW
PSYCHOLOGY OF MODERN PERSUASION 114-66 (1993). The unraveling of norms is also
related to the phenomenon of information cascades. See supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
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undesirable. Second, the state could manipulate groups in such a
way that causes the groups to adopt new norms.
a. Individuals
It might seem hopeless for state officials to try to convince the
village gossips that the railroad deserves the entitlement or that the
farmer deserves the entitlement. But this kind of state action is
more plausible in other contexts. In the case of racially discrimina-
tory norms, for example, the state can try to prevent children from
adopting these norms by teaching them in public school not to
discriminate on the basis of race.79 State officials can also try to
persuade adults to abandon discriminatory norms through a variety
of public and symbolic acts of nondiscrimination, such as the use of
nondiscriminatory hiring practices for government employment and
the celebration of the achievements of minorities.80
The likelihood that any approach will be successful depends on
the causes of the inefficiency. Suppose, for example, that employers
would like to hire minorities but defer to discriminatory community
norms. If all employers in unison started hiring minorities, it is
possible that the village gossips could not punish the employers
adequately as a group. Nonetheless, each employer may decline to
make the first move, fearing that if the others back out at the last
minute, it would bear the brunt of the community's wrath. The
government, however, can counteract this coordination problem.
If government agencies-especially agencies competing with local
businesses for the same employees-hire minorities, then the risks
attending the first move are reduced."'
These state practices, however, will not always change inefficient
norms. For example, if the discriminatory norm is the result of
deeply felt sentiments, then government action is unlikely to change
the norm, and may even strengthen it. Rather than undermining
9 See, e.g., Ellen Graham, Schools Try Lessons in Tolerance to Battle Bias, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 10, 1995, at BI (describing school-imposed detention and "behavior
modification" exercises for students who are caught teasing minority students); cf.
John R. Lott, Jr., An Explanation for Public Provision of Schooling: The Importance of
Indoctrination, 33J.L. & EcoN. 199, 201 (1990) (arguing that indoctrination in public
schools lowers the cost of wealth transfers by instilling views that rationalize them).
'0 For a discussion of a variety of such strategies, see Lawrence Lessig, The
Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943, 1008-14 (1995).
81 See id. at 965-67 (explaining how the Civil Rights Act of 1964 might have
eliminated the first move problem and enabled businesses to engage in more efficient
hiring).
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the norm, the government's opposition to the norm undermines the
government.
Although most people acknowledge that the state, through
public schools, should play a role in inculcating children with
certain norms, many people resist attempts by the state to play a
similar role with respect to adults. But, once one acknowledges that
laws inevitably strengthen or weaken social norms by signaling an
official stance toward them,82 it becomes important for legal
analysis to account for this phenomenon.
b. Groups
The state can also undermine inefficient norms by manipulating
the groups in which those norms prevail. To achieve this goal, the
state can attempt to suppress groups or it can attempt to influence
their leaders.
An attempt to undermine a group in which inefficient norms
prevail may involve penalizing members of the group for cooperat-
ing, rewarding them for free-riding, and independently supplying
the collective goods which members seek from the group.3 For
example, the state could penalize (with criminal sanctions) members
of a group (such as a criminal gang) in which inefficient norms
prevail, reward them for defecting (witness protection), and
independently provide the collective good that members seek from
the group (employment and training programs). As I discuss the
legal regulation of groups elsewhere, I need not go into detail
here.
8 4
' See id. at 957 (explaining how governments affect "social meanings to advance
state ends"); Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy:
A Comment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REV. 936, 938-39 (1991) (arguing that
analyses of public law should include an account of its cultural consequences); Cass
R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 820-24
(1994) (discussing the "expressive power" of law to affect social norms); Cass R.
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2036-43 (1996)
(discussing how "participants in law compare the statement made by law with the
consequences produced by law"). Lessig's article contains several useful examples of
government efforts to change sex and smoking norms. See Lessig, supra note 80, at
1019-34.
" See generally Posner, Regulation of Groups, supra note 3, at 144-55 (discussing
different methods by which the state can modify group behavior and how these
methods affect efficiency and wealth distribution).
4 Other examples include state approaches to the problem of dueling (providing
judicial resolution of disputes, penalizing duelers, and rewarding antidueling societies)
and common-pool degradation (licensing groups). See infra parts IV.A to IV.B.
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A useful example comes from the problem of assigning liability
to medical practitioners after an operation that tortiously injures the
patient. As is well known, powerful norms dictate that none of
those present at the operation disclose the identity of the tortfeasor.
The norms benefit all members of the group, even the innocent
members, as long as there is a chance that anyone could commit a
tort in any given operation. These norms defeat the norm-violation
approach of simply penalizing the tortfeasor. When the norms
succeed, the courts cannot assign liability and the parties have no
legal incentive to take care (although they may have a market
incentive).
Now consider a law that makes all present at the operation
jointly and severally liable for the injury. The law could have two
effects. First, it could cause norm-violation: the innocent actors
squeal on the wrongdoer in order to avoid liability (supposing there
is a doctrine of contribution). Second, it could cause norm-
transformation. The group develops a norm of due care because
the desire to avoid liability gives every actor an incentive to monitor
the care with which others act and to punish them with nonlegal
sanctions if the care is insufficient.8 5
The interesting point about the group-based approach is that
although it is risky and difficult for the state to try to transform
norms directly, for example, through propaganda, it may be less
risky and difficult to transform norms through the intermediate
participation of a group. Because group members have more
information about each other and more control over each other's
behavior than does the state, they are in a better position to impose
effective sanctions in such a way that transforms norms.
c. Efficiency Implications of Transforming Norms
If the state successfully uses the technique of norm-violation to
cause people to violate an inefficient norm, then it produces a
surplus. But an enhancement of efficiency occurs only if the
surplus exceeds the size of the negative externality imposed on
those who value the norm. The transformation of an inefficient
norm into an efficient norm differs from the technique of norm-
violation in two significant ways.
' For a discussion, see Saul Levmore, Gomorrah to Ybarra and More: Overextraction
and the Puzzle of Immoderate Group Liability, 81 VA. L. REv. 1561, 1562-63 (1995).
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First, new efficient patterns of behavior, because they are
consistent with the new efficient norm, generally impose no
negative externalities on the observers. Under the norm-violation
approach, the traditionalist is distressed to see the repeated and
state-sanctioned violation of an important norm. Under the norm-
transformation approach, however, the traditionalist, the intui-
tionist, and perhaps the deontologist do not see the new pattern of
behavior as a violation of a norm because they endorse the new
norm that permits the behavior. Nonetheless, envious people will
suffer as much under the norm-transformation approach as under
the norm-violation approach if both approaches increase the wealth
of the sources of their envy.
Second, under the norm-transformation approach, the state does
not have to continually expend resources to cause people to engage
in the desired pattern of behavior. In contrast, under the norm-
violation approach, the state must engage in constant rewarding and
penalizing. The norm-transformation approach, however, in order
to effect the transformation, may require a large initial investment
that exceeds the continuing costs associated with norm-violation.
Of course, the village gossips must incur the costs of norm enforce-
ment even if the state does not.
3. Norm-Circumvention
The Coase theorem implies that inefficient laws do not necessar-
ily lead to inefficient outcomes. If transaction costs are low, parties
bargain around the laws to a deal that allocates entitlements
efficiently."6 By the same token, inefficient norms do not necessar-
ily lead to inefficient outcomes because, if transaction costs are low,
parties strike a deal that allocates entitlements efficiently.
If it is expensive for the state either to override or transform
inefficient norms, the Coase theorem suggests that the welfare-
maximizing state should remain passive when parties can cheaply
bargain around the inefficient norms. But when high transaction
costs prevent such bargaining, and when the cost of undermining or
transforming inefficient norms exceeds the cost to the state of
reducing those transaction costs, the state should reduce the
transaction costs.
The most obvious method of minimizing parties' transaction
costs is to enforce contracts as drafted and to choose efficient
86 See Coase, supra note 32, at 2-8.
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default rules. This analysis is identical to the conventional econom-
ic analysis of contract law and so need not be repeated here.87 It
should be noted, however, that judicial enforcement need not be
the only legal recognition of such contracts; legislative solutions may
also be appropriatea
In the context of inefficient norms, another method of minimiz-
ing transaction costs is to refine the property rights granted by
norms. This method recommends itself because norms are often
formulated retroactively in a way that is hard to anticipate. For
example, whether the farmer has the (normative) entitlement in a
particular case may not be determined until the crowd is moved (or
not) to criticize the railroad for the fire it caused; whether members
of the crowd are so moved might depend on factors unrelated to
the efficiencies of the case (such as whether or not the crowd is
currently employed). In light of these uncertainties, it might be
difficult for the farmer and the railroad to bargain over the
entitlement ex ante. A law that granted a clear entitlement to one
party or the other, but which attempted to conform to the vague
(and inefficient) normative entitlement, would facilitate bargaining
to the efficient outcome. The law does not transfer the entitlement
through a system of rewards and penalties (norm-violation) or
propaganda (norm-transformation). Indeed, it confirms and
clarifies the entitlement. But by clarifying it, the law facilitates a
voluntary transfer to the more-valued use."8
A useful example comes from the problem of reducing air
pollution. There seems to be a weak norm against polluting the
air-weak in the sense that most people think that air pollution is
undesirable, but nonlegal sanctions do not suffice to deter it.
Straightforward norm-violation approaches, such as legal punish-
ment of polluters, have been criticized for being rigid and ineffi-
cient. 9 Norm-transformation in this context seems unlikely to be
effective. No amount of education and government-sponsored
television commercials are going to prevent paper mills from
87 See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcONOMICS 228-41
(1988) (presenting an economic theory of contract law).
88 For example, common-pool users sometimes seek legislative confirmation of
their deals. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 71, at 284-89.
89 Cf. COOTER. & ULEN, supra note 87, at 100 (stating that "[o]ne well-confirmed
result in the literature on bargaining is that bargainers are more likely to cooperate
when their rights are clear, and less likely to agree when their rights are ambiguous").
9o See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 263-71 (1982) (criticizing
command-and-control environmental regulation).
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spewing forth pollution. These failures have led to efforts to
encourage norm-circumvention-in the form of the market in
tradeable emission rights such as that authorized by the 1990
amendments to the Clean Air Act.91
The easiest way to understand this argument is to imagine that
there is a general norm not to pollute "too much." Firms are
entitled to pollute a bit, especially when they employ a lot of people
and produce valuable goods. But if firms exceed a certain threshold
of pollution, neighbors complain, consumers boycott, and so on.
This norm is inefficient, the argument goes, because it does not
distinguish clearly between high-value polluters and low-value
polluters and thus does not allow citizens to attain the optimal mix
of production and clean air. Even supposing firms want to obey the
norm, it is difficult to predict in advance, when capital investments
are made, how much pollution is enough to provoke sanctions. The
Clean Air Act, however, transforms a firm's norm-grounded
entitlement to pollute "a little" into a property right that can be
traded on the market. In doing so, the Act creates predictability
and (in theory) a cheaper form of pollution control.
One source of the high cost of bargaining around inefficient
norms is community disapproval. As suggested earlier, the village
gossips may or may not object to attempts by parties to bargain
around an inefficient norm, depending on the source of their
support for that norm. Envious people and traditionalists may
object to circumvention; deontologists would probably be indiffer-
ent. If people object to a given circumvention, then bargaining
around it might be prohibitively expensive.
The importance of community disapproval of bargaining
depends on the observability of the bargain. The state can thus
facilitate bargaining by helping the parties structure the bargain in
such a way that makes the violation of the norm hard to observe.
This phenomenon is illustrated vividly by the history of governmen-
tal responses to usury norms. Norms prohibiting the charging of
interest interfered with governments' attempts to raise money and
support commercialization. 2 People often tried to bargain around
91 
See PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
255 (1994).
' For a discussion, see Posner, supra note 72, at 312-13; see also BENJAMIN N.
NELSON, THE IDEA OF USURY (2d ed. 1969) (tracing the history of usury norms); R.H.
Tawney, Introduction to THOMAS WILSON, A DISCOURSE UPON USURY 1, 106-21 (R.H.
Tawney ed., 1925) (discussing the influence of medieval religious doctrine on
attitudes toward usury).
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usury norms by structuring loans as sales, leases, profit-sharing
agreements, and other morally neutral transactions. Many govern-
ments encouraged this behavior by enforcing the transactions-and
this willingness to enforce, rather than to look through the form to
the substance, is an example of legal facilitation of contractual
circumvention of inefficient norms.
93
The efficiency implications of enhancing the parties' ability to
bargain around an inefficient norm are similar to those of the
norm-violation and norm-circumvention strategies. If bargaining
around the norm is itself a violation of a norm, then encouraging
bargaining has the same efficiency implications as encouraging
norm-violation. If bargaining around the norm is not itself a
violation of the norm, then encouraging bargaining does not injure
any third parties, except perhaps the envious.
IV. SOME ILLUSTRATIONS
The purpose of this Part is to illustrate, in a general but
suggestive manner, the propositions that: (1) important inefficient
norms have prevailed within relatively close-knit groups; and (2)
forms of state intervention can be understood as attempts to
transform the norms or blunt their impact.
A. Dueling
Dueling norms prevailed in many close-knit groups, such as the
aristocracies of European countries (and the Old South) and the
officer corps of their armies.94  Scholars have proposed two
general theories of dueling norms. Under the "cartel theory,"
dueling norms acted as an entry barrier to the market for offices.
When dueling is an accepted means for resolving disputes between
people who hold offices, skilled duelists have an advantage in the
market for offices over unskilled duelists. Because the aristocrats
were better able to educate their children in dueling than common-
ers, the dueling norms gave an advantage to the aristocracy.
95
Under the "efficiency theory," dueling norms served to ensure
" For a discussion of bargaining around usury norms, see Posner, supra note 72,
at 301-03.
See FRANCOIS BILLACOIS, THE DUEL. ITS RISE AND FALL IN EARLY MODERN
FRANCE (Trista Selous ed. & trans., 1990); V.G. KIERNAN, THE DUEL IN EUROPEAN
HISTORY 92-115 (1988); EDWARD MUIR, MAD BLOOD STIRRING: VENDETTA AND
FACTIONS IN FRIULI DURING THE RENAISSANCE 247-52 (1993).
95See HARDIN, supra note 39, at 92-93.
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cooperation among aristocrats. Dueling norms required members
of the aristocracy to enforce general norms of cooperation.9
Let me focus on the efficiency theory. When societies are not
sufficiently wealthy or organized to support powerful, centralized
governments, rules of conduct must be enforced in a decentralized
way. At the most basic level, people can deter opportunistic or
predatory behavior simply by retaliating. 7 The problems with
retaliation are: (1) the predator might defeat the person who
tries to retaliate; (2) the retaliator might, by intention or acci-
dent, sanction too harshly the predator (in effect, becoming a
predator himself); and (3) a destructive cycle of feuding might
result.
A society with dueling minimizes these problems by reducing the
risk of injury-elaborate formalities often inhibit violence-and by
providing means for the publication of predatory behavior (dueling
codes provide for witnesses and often for advertisement of the
conflict and its source) so that deterrence will result." In essence,
dueling prevents disputes from exploding into feuds by formalizing
and channeling the means of enforcement." The efficiency theory
thus does not claim that dueling is the optimal means of social
organization, but that, given the times, it represented an improve-
ment over prior means of organization.
When the state finally obtains a monopoly on legitimate force
and the means to use it, however, dueling ceases to be an efficient
institution. The superior efficiency of police and courts can be seen
in many ways. The bureaucratized state uses experts in law
enforcement, whereas the duelist is an amateur. The state obtains
economies of scale in the use of force, whereas dueling does not
' See Warren F. Schwartz et al., The Duek Can These Gentlemen Be Acting
Efficiently?, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 321,332-43 (1984). I simplify the authors' more subtle
argument.
I See MUIR, supra note 94, at 278 (discussing feuding as "a rational and systematic
means of resolving conflict" in traditional societies). Elster criticizes the theory that
revenge or retaliation is socially efficient. See Elster, supra note 40, at 876-81. I assert
only that dueling is probably a more efficient means of social control than is feuding.
11 See Schwartz et al., supra note 96, at 323 n.9. Some of the most interesting
aspects of duels are the elaborate practices that surround them that ensure proper
evaluation and publication of the underlying dispute. See e.g., MUIR, supra note 94,
at 258-59 (noting that in 16th century Italy, the duel was observed by ajudge, who
afterward "made two different kinds ofdeterminations: who was the superior fighter
and who was correct in the quarrel" and that "the findings had to be written up,
signed by ajudge, and certified by a notary").
9 See MUIR, supra note 94, at 276-82.
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keep order when large factions obtain power. The state's officials
enforce rules impartially, whereas people can enforce dueling norms
opportunistically-to obtain advantages rather than just to resolve
disputes.
It seems likely that in many countries, dueling norms lasted long
after they ceased to be efficient. In the old South, dueling lasted
until the Civil War; in many European countries, including France
and Germany, it persisted through most of the nineteenth century
and even into the twentieth. 1°° But commentators had begun to
condemn dueling, on practical as well as on moral and religious
grounds, as early as the Middle Ages. By the 1600s and 1700s,
commentators, the general public, and government officials saw
dueling as an anachronism, and states tried to stomp it out.''
And yet the norms persisted.
Why did dueling norms persist beyond the time that changing
social and political conditions had undermined their efficiency?
First, dueling norms depended initially on deeply internalized
norms and beliefs; people could not shed them in an instant. °2
Second, dueling norms favored certain people over others: the
good duelists over the bad, and those whose interests were bound
to the old order over those whose interests were bound to the
new.0 3 Those favored resisted efforts to eliminate dueling, and
as long as dueling norms dominated, those disfavored could not
openly oppose them and could not refuse challenges without losing
status. 1° 4 Third, dueling vindicated the moral outrage provoked
'0o See KIERNAN,supra note 94, at 271-92; Schwartz et al., supra note 96, at 348-49.
101 In 1563, the Council of Trent decreed the excommunication of duelists and
governments that did not seek to suppress dueling, this decree apparently influenced
law and practice in Italy and Spain. See KIERNAN, supra note 94, at 92. In France, the
first serious antidueling law was enacted in 1602. See BILLACOIS, supra note 94, at 97.
Louis XIV may have successfully stomped out dueling during his reign in the late
1600s and early 1700s-the penalty for violation was death. See KIERNAN, supra note
94, at 95-96. But see BILLAcoIs, supra note 94, at 175-81 (questioning the view that
Louis XIV ended the practice of dueling). James VI of England declared dueling a
capital crime in 1600, but his law did not have much effect. See KIERNAN, supra note
94, at 104. In Austria, dueling was criminalized at the end of the 18th century. See
id. at 193.
102 Kiernan discusses internalization throughout his book. See KIERNAN, supra note
94.
103 This is the cartel theory. See HARDIN, supra note 39, at 93.
104 See MUIR, supra note 94, at 260-61; see also HARDIN, supra note 39, at 93-95
(quoting Montesquieu for the proposition that ifa person is challenged to a duel, he
cannot win: "If he obeys the laws of honor, he perishes on the scaffold; if those of
justice, he is banished forever from the society of men").
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by opportunistic behavior and may have seemed more morally
satisfying to the observer than the dry and technical operations of
the state.
In sum, information problems (which prevented the speedy
realization by large numbers of people that dueling had exhausted
its advantages), strategic behavior, and moral tradition inhibited the
abandonment of dueling norms even after the state became a more
efficient institution for resolving disputes. This is why both the
efficiency theory and the cartel theory are plausible: what may have
begun as an efficient mechanism of social order ended up as a
barrier to change supported by those who benefited from it
disproportionately." 5 As dueling lost its original justification, it
became an anachronism, and pressure mounted for state interven-
tion. 1
06
Why did the dueling norms disappear? Perhaps information
about the duel's relative ineffectiveness at achieving social order in
comparison to the modern criminal justice system finally became
widespread; perhaps the old guard died out; and perhaps moral
traditions lost their force. The role of the state is obscure, but two
points can be made. First, states attempted to use the norm-
violation approach in order to undermine dueling norms. This
approach must have had an effect at the margin, but the magnitude
of this effect cannot be known. Second, states may have used the
norm-transformation approach. An example, discussed by Lessig,
is a law that denies offices to convicted duelists, as opposed to a law
that punishes them with execution or imprisonment. Lessig
conjectures that the first law enables a person to avoid a challenge
by claiming a higher obligation to serve his country or class (by
holding office), rather than by admitting an interest in saving his
skin (from execution)."' If dueling norms derived their power
10s See KIERNAN, supra note 94, at 115, 127, 135, 148, 158, 325, 329.
1"6 See supra note 101. Of course, the effectiveness of government attempts to
suppress dueling was always uncertain: enforcement was rare and royal pardons were
frequent, but sometimes (as, according to some historians, under Louis XIV)
enforcement was nevertheless effective. Moreover, even though the death penalty was
rarely carried out, duelists were often (as in France) banished, and exile seriously
injured their wealth, status, and careers. See BILLACOIS, supra note 94, at 109-11.
Monarchs were ambivalent: they sought to replace duels with the machinery of the
state, but because they also depended on the aristocracy for political support, they
could not ignore its interests. A similar ambivalence appeared in the Old South,
where dueling was subject to heavy criminal punishments; but duelists were often
spared. See Schwartz et al., supra note 96, at 326-29.
o7 See Lessig, supra note 80, at 968-72.
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from the view that they supported a class whose sense of superiority
lay (in part) in its political power and obligation, then Lessig's
conjecture is plausible.1
0 8
B. Common Pools
The literature on common pools provides a vast resource for
testing ideas about norms. The modem development of this
literature begins with an article by Garrett Hardin, which points out
that rational actors will overexploit commons, such as fisheries,
groundwater systems, and forests. 9 Hardin's argument initially
seemed to support government intervention. Field work, however,
has suggested that government intervention has sometimes been the
cause of overexploitation, not the solution, and that the communi-
ties of people who control common pools often develop norms and
nonlegal sanctions that solve the common-pool problem."
0
Still, the literature has not produced a clean resolution and now
consists of efforts to identify the conditions under which common-
pool problems are solved. The efficient-norm view predicts that
common pools are governed by efficient norms when (1) only a
close-knit group has access to the common pool; (2) the state
enforces underlying property rights; and (3) endowments are
relatively equal.
Evidence for this argument at first appears strong: communities
that govern common pools often display an impressive level of
cooperation. The literature contains many examples of communi-
ties that develop intricate norms for regulating common pools, even
in cases where the common pools would seem to involve intractable
108I have found no evidence of state encouragement of norm-circumvention.
There were, however, private attempts. People formed antiduelingsocieties in which
members pledged not to engage in duels and which pressured states to outlaw
dueling. See KIERNAN, supra note 94, at 216-17. It would be interesting to know
whether governments encouraged these societies, as the strategy of norm-circumven-
tion would suggest.
"o8 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45
(1968); see also H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource:
The Fishey, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124, 128-35 (1954) (discussing the incentives for
overexploitation of fisheries).
110 See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTiTUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 143-81 (1990) [hereinafter OSTROM,
GOVERNING] (analyzing successes and failures in common-pool resource exploitation);
OSTROM ET AL., supra note 71, at 225-316 (discussing data obtained in the field on the
irrigation, inshore fisheries, forestry, and groundwater sectors); see also Rose, supra
note 3, at 742 (discussing custom as a means of managing a commons).
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problems of measurement and enforcement.1 The studies often
show that the communities exploit the resource at just the level that
ensures renewal and that they are able to adjust their level of
exploitation in response to moderate changes in environmental
conditions.11 2  Moreover, failures of these arrangements often
occur not because of the community's inability to solve the
common-pool problem, but because of clumsy and unnecessary
government intervention that undermines the delicate network of
cooperative norms.'"
But there are several problems with the efficiency thesis.1
4
First, communal regulation of common pools is vulnerable to
sudden changes in technology and the environment. In a study of
a Sri Lankan fishery, the author concluded that although the
community had solved the common-pool problem at various periods
of history, rapid technological change (such as the invention of
superior nets and the introduction of mechanized boats) and
economic change (such as demand surges caused by World War H
and subsequent economic development) undermined these
arrangements, causing overexploitation problems."' The avail-
ability of the superior nets, for example, led to overinvestment by
the fishermen, who did not realize that the common pool could
support only a small number of the nets."' Sudden changes
produce lags, during which the system slowly struggles toward a new
equilibrium.
Second, communal regulation is vulnerable to opportunistic
behavior. Most noticeable in the common-pool literature is the
ability of wealthy, powerful, high-status, or simply violent members
of the group to push through rules that favor them at the expense
of the group and of the pool. In a study of six village-run commun-
ity forest systems located in the Himalayas, for example, the factor
that seemed to distinguish the successful villages from the unsuc-
cessful was the presence of powerful figures in the latter who were
11 See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 71, at 225-316; see also id. at 327-28 (discussing
the various case studies).
12 See id. at 327-28.
n1 See OSTROM, GOVERNING, supra note 110, at 8-28.
n A methodological problem with the thesis is that renewal of a common pool
is not decisive evidence of efficient behavior, although it is evidence of cooperative
behavior. Renewal is consistent with underexploitation of the common pool for the
purpose of creating above-market prices.
us See PAUL ALEXANDER, SRI LANKAN FISHERMEN: RURAL CAPITALISM AND
PEASANT SOCIETY 261-62 (1982).
116 See id. at 97-102.
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able to insist on an auction system for the right to forage. The
auction system allowed the wealthy figures to obtain and overforage
the best lands, leading to overexploitation. Meanwhile, in the
successful villages, an intricate system of rules prevented anyone
from overforaging."
7
Third, envy, resentment, and morality-especially traditionalism-
could play a role in the management of common pools."' While
the influence of these factors is generally not studied, and it is
always difficult to decide whether they simply reflect economic
strategies, their effect cannot be ignored.
The implications of these problems for government regulation
are complex. Ellickson's hypothesis that the norms of close-knit
groups are efficient generally assumes government enforcement of
basic property rights." 9 Some communities are so closely knit,
however, that they can solve common-pool problems even without
government enforcement of basic property rights. 120  Others,
although apparently closely knit, quite clearly need greater govern-
mental involvement. In a study of a Turkish fishing community, for
example, the author found that the community overexploited its
fishery in part because it was not able to limit fishing by its own
members. 121 In cases such as this one, government licensing may
deter overexploitation.
Government response to common-pool problems has taken
several forms. First, governments sometimes impose their own
regulations on the pool (norm-violation). For example, they issue
licenses or they regulate production and price. 12 2 Second, govern-
"' See Arun Agrawal, Rules, Rule Making and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit
Between Rule Systems and Resource Use, in OSTROM ET AL., supra note 71, at 267ff.
Ellickson excludes from his efficient-norms hypothesis groups that contain
members who are unequally endowed, but by doing so he risks making his hypothesis
irrelevant since this condition rarely obtains. See ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 177-78.
"n A flavor of this is given in ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 22-25 (describing the
differences in outlook between the "traditionalist" and "modernist" cattle ranchers);
id. at 52-64 (describing moral attitudes and resentment); id. at 114-15 (describing
conflict between moral attitude and law).
'
1 9 See id. at 174-76. Ellickson also suggests that such "foundational" rights could
be established nonlegally, but he does not elaborate on this idea.
" See, e.g., Margaret A. McKean, Management of Traditional Common Lands
(Iriaichi) in Japan, in MAKING THE COMMONS WORK 63, 70 (Daniel W. Bromley ed.,
1992) (national control "[flor the most part... [did] not affect the governing of
common lands, which were managed freely and independently by the villagers").
121 See Fikret Berkes, Success and Failure in Marine Coastal Fisheries of Turkey, in
MAKING THE COMMONS WORK, supra note 120, at 161, 178-79.
i2 See OSTROM, GOVERNING, supra note 110, at 213-14.
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ments sometimes allow the group a great deal of autonomy, but still
influence the group in subtle ways-for example, by providing the
group with information about the resource and encouraging
cooperation (norm-transformation). 28 Third, governments create
tradeable property rights in the common pool (norm-circumven-
tion).' 24
CONCLUSION
The recent work on law and social norms is best understood as
an investigation of the ways in which the state can support and
hinder attempts by people to cooperate for the purpose of produc-
ing collective goods. Against an old, albeit much criticized,
tradition in economics of assuming that state intervention is a
necessary condition of the production of collective goods, scholars
like Ellickson have argued that people can produce collective goods
without state intervention. They can do so because they are
frequently governed by norms that maximize the surplus produced
by cooperative behavior.
The purpose of this Article has been to complicate the Ellick-
sonian view. It has done so by showing that even close-knit groups
are likely to produce inefficient norms and that these norms may be
less efficient than the rules produced by the state. This Article has
argued that the proper approach to the problem of collective
behavior is a systematic comparison of private and state mecha-
nisms, with attention to the ways in which each solves problems of
information, coordination, and opportunism. The comparison is
inevitably a messy business, depending to a great extent on context.
But theory is helpful for identifying factors that are most likely, in
a given case, to be relevant.
The analysis raises more problems than it solves. Let me
identify two that seem most urgent and should provide the basis of
future research. First, there is not yet a precise understanding of
the way norms work and evolve. Part of the problem is that the
word "norm" is used to describe many different kinds of phen-
omena. This might just be because the concept of "norm" is
intrinsically slippery in a way that the concept of, say, "statute" is
not. Second, there is a need for a positive theory that relates the
l See id. at 212-13 (discussing groundwater basins).
124 See supra text accompanying note 91 (discussing the 1990 Clean Air Act
amendments).
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evolution of norms to the development of statutes and common law
doctrines. Most of the existing work is normative. But conclusions
about the desirability of state intervention must await a more
complete understanding of how norms evolve and of how legal
institutions evolve with and in response to them.
